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Johnny St. Valentine Brown, Jr. was a veteran nar-
cotics detective.  Brown – who went by the nickname “Jehru” –
had nearly thirty years of experience investigating drug cases
on the streets of the District of Columbia.  He had worked as an
undercover officer buying drugs, as a detective investigating
major drug rings, and in virtually all other aspects of narcotics
law enforcement.  He had worked for the federal government in
the Office of National Drug Control Policy and as an investiga-
tor for a congressional committee studying drug trafficking.
Brown was so good that the D.C. United States Attorney’s
Office regularly asked him to teach new prosecutors about ille-
gal drugs and how they are used, packaged, and sold.  When I
joined the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 1989, Brown gave the nar-
cotics lecture to my training class of new Assistant U.S.
Attorneys.
Jehru’s real fame, however, was as an expert witness.
Almost all criminal drug cases, even the most routine, require
the prosecution to present a “drug expert.”  These witnesses,
usually experienced narcotics investigators, testify about such
matters as police procedures for handling drug evidence and the
packaging and sale of illegal drugs on the street.  Due to the vol-
ume of drug prosecutions, these experts are in great demand.
Good ones may testify in several different cases in a single day. 
As a drug expert, Brown was a prosecutor’s dream.
He was good looking, well-dressed, and charismatic, with a rich
baritone voice.  He would turn and speak directly to the jury
when testifying, like a college professor patiently instructing a
class of freshmen.   He was always professional, always pre-
pared, incredibly knowledgeable, and never lost his cool.  Juries
loved him.  Defense lawyers feared him.  Prosecutors would
rearrange the order of witnesses they intended to call, just to
accommodate Jehru’s busy schedule.  Brown was not only
good, he was prolific.  According to one report, by the late
1990’s Brown had testified in more than four thousand trials in
twenty-six jurisdictions and one hundred and twelve cities,
although his primary venue was the District of Columbia.2
Expert witnesses usually begin their testimony by dis-
cussing their background and training, in order to establish their
qualifications.  Brown was no exception, and each time he tes-
tified he began with a lengthy recitation of his considerable
experience.  It was almost a matter of rote; while he was talk-
ing to the jury about his background, prosecutors would review
their notes and defense attorneys would plan their cross-exam-
ination.  Everyone who tried drug cases knew Jehru.  Everyone
knew he was eminently qualified and that there could be no
serious challenge to his expertise.
In the summer of 1999, Brown was retained by the
D.C. government as an expert witness for the defense in a civil
case.  The government was being sued by the family of a young
man who was killed while working as a confidential informant
for the police.  When the plaintiff’s lawyer took his deposition,
Brown testified that in addition to his extensive experience
within the police department, he had earned a graduate degree
from the Howard University School of Pharmacy.  The plain-
tiff’s lawyer was unfamiliar with Brown and decided to check
him out.  With a few phone calls, he learned that Brown had
never attended Howard University, much less obtained a
degree.  When the civil attorney exposed these lies, Brown was
removed as an expert witness in the case.3
This all came to light while I was serving as the Chief
of the Public Corruption/Government Fraud section of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office – the unit charged with prosecuting police
misconduct.  Our review of the transcripts in a few recent drug
cases confirmed our fears: Brown had told similar lies in a num-
ber of criminal trials while testifying as an expert for the pros-
ecution.  He had regularly claimed to have earned an undergrad-
uate or graduate degree in pharmacology from Howard
University in the 1960’s.  In a number of cases he had falsely
testified that he was a board-certified pharmacist.  Sometimes
he had testified that he actually worked for a time as a pharma-
cist, dispensing prescription drugs at several local drugstores
and grocery stores.  These claims had been made during the rote
recitations of his credentials that lawyers in drug cases had
heard so many times, and had gone unchallenged by both pros-
ecutors and defense attorneys.
Faced with what we had learned, my colleagues and I
had to decide what to do.  We considered it extremely unlikely
that Brown’s lies had actually affected the outcome of any
cases.  There was no evidence that he had lied about anything
other than his own credentials.  He had testified only as an
expert, he was not a fact witness who identified the particular
defendants or testified about their involvement in the case.  The
matters about which he testified were generally uncontroversial
and could have been testified to by scores of other experts.
Most significantly, Brown’s true expertise was based on his
years of work on the streets as a narcotics investigator; any for-
mal education that he did or did not have paled in significance
next to that experience.  Nevertheless, although the prosecutors
had not known it at the time, our office now had information
that a government witness had lied under oath in numerous
cases that had resulted in criminal convictions.  We also knew
that most defense attorneys who had represented clients in those
cases probably were unaware that this was even an issue, and
likely would remain unaware – unless we told them about it.
Editor’s Note: The following article is in response to
Prosecutorial Misconduct: An Abuse of Power and
Discretion, 1 CRIM. L. BRIEF 16 (2006), by American
University Washington College of Law Professor and former
Director of the Public Defender Service for the District of
Columbia, Angela Davis.  In her article, which appeared in
the last issue of this journal, Professor Davis argued that
there is a widespread culture of prosecutorial misconduct
that has gone unchecked by the courts, that this misconduct
has reached epidemic proportions, and that the legal profes-
sion must take the lead in instituting meaningful reform.
Professor Davis’s article can be found at:
http://www.wcl.american.edu/journals/clb/
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So we told them about it.  The U.S. Attorney’s office
identified every case we could in which Brown had testified for
us as an expert.  We wrote to all defense counsel in those cases
and informed them of the potential issue, in order to allow them
to review the records and consider filing any appropriate
motions.  We also wrote letters to the local and federal public
defender’s offices notifying them of the potential problems with
Brown’s testimony.  In addition, we published a notice about
Brown’s perjury in the Daily Washington Law Reporter, a wide-
ly-read local legal periodical, to try to get the word out to as
many defense attorneys as possible.4 In a few cases where we
believed Brown’s testimony was arguably more consequential,
we voluntarily agreed to vacate the convictions or allowed the
defendants to plead guilty to lesser charges.  In dozens of other
cases, defense attorneys filed motions to vacate the convictions,
and those motions were resolved by a judge.5
We also indicted Brown on multiple counts of perjury
and sent him to federal prison.6
Nearly ten years before the Jehru inci-
dent, when I was prosecuting narcotics cases in
federal court, a case was transferred to me that
was about to go to trial.  The defendant was
charged with distribution of crack cocaine.  It
was a typical “buy-bust” case.  In such a case, a
team of investigators went to a known drug mar-
ket and an undercover officer walked into the
area to buy drugs.  After a successful purchase,
the undercover officer would leave the area and
radio a description of the seller to an arrest team waiting near-
by.  The arrest team (also called the “jump outs”) would then
drive quickly to the area, jump out of their vehicles, and stop the
suspect who fit the description.  The undercover officer would
come by in a car and make a “drive-by identification,” telling
the jump outs whether they had the right person.  If the identi-
fication was positive, the suspect would be placed under arrest.
I had handled dozens of such cases, as had every prosecutor in
the narcotics section.
As I began to prepare for trial, however, some things
about this particular case didn’t feel right.  The more I examined
the evidence, listened to the tapes of the police radio transmis-
sions, and interviewed the officers, the more uncomfortable I
became.  No single glaring problem stood out, but based on my
experience with many such cases, I was troubled.  Too many lit-
tle things did not add up.  I began to doubt whether the police
had actually arrested the right person.  
I knew that if I took the case to trial, there was a good
chance the defendant would be convicted.  After all, the under-
cover officer was ready to testify that the defendant was the
same man who had sold him the drugs.  Jurors who had not seen
many such cases before might not pick up on some of the issues
that were bothering me, and the defense attorney might miss
some or all of them as well.  I knew my doubts could be wrong,
and that the defendant might well be guilty.  But I also knew
that the defendant was facing a mandatory minimum ten-year
sentence, and that I would be the one putting him in jail.  
I have always believed that, as a prosecutor, you can’t
stand in front of a jury and ask them to do something you would
not do yourself.  I was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
of this defendant’s guilt, so I knew I could not in good con-
science ask a jury to convict him.  I spoke with my supervisor
about my concerns, and he said I was authorized to do what I
thought was best.  On the morning of trial, I walked into court
and dismissed the case.  
In a more recent and much more high-profile case, fed-
eral prosecutors in Alexandria, Virginia were seeking the death
penalty in the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui.  Moussaoui,
the so-called “twentieth hijacker,” was accused of being
involved in the plotting that led up to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks.  During the trial, an attorney for the
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) committed a
flagrant violation of the court’s orders.  The attorney (who was
not a prosecutor but had been working with the prosecution
team) e-mailed transcripts of trial testimony to upcoming gov-
ernment witnesses, thus sharing with them what other witness-
es had said.  This was a violation of the so-called “rule on wit-
nesses” typically invoked in almost every case.  The TSA attor-
ney also appeared to be coaching the witnesses on how to shape
their upcoming testimony.7
How did the judge learn of this misconduct?
The prosecutors told her.  As soon as they
learned of the TSA attorney’s actions, the pros-
ecutors notified the court and defense counsel,
who did not know about it and who may have
never learned about it.  The prosecutors did so
even though they knew the revelation would do
tremendous damage to the most important case
of their careers.  In court papers disclosing the
TSA attorney’s actions to the court and defense,
the prosecutors called her behavior “reprehensible.”8 The
judge, when explaining to the jury what had happened, noted
that the prosecutors deserved “great credit” for bringing the
matter to the court’s attention.9
None of these stories strike me as particularly remark-
able or noble.  They are simply examples of prosecutors doing
their jobs and trying to do the right thing.  These stories would
seem strangely out of place, however, in the prosecutorial world
described by Professor Angela J. Davis in the debut issue of this
Journal (Prosecutorial Misconduct: An Abuse of Power and
Discretion, Criminal Law Brief, Spring 2006).  Professor Davis
argues that prosecutorial misconduct is widespread and routine
and has reached epidemic proportions.10 She claims that pros-
ecutors consistently and deliberately violate their ethical and
professional obligations, and even break the law, in pursuit of a
“win at any cost” agenda.11
In the world portrayed by Professor Davis, the U.S.
Attorney’s Office no doubt would have tried to bury the infor-
mation about Detective Brown’s lies in the criminal trials, in
hopes that defense attorneys would never learn about them.  We
certainly would not have prosecuted our former star witness for
perjury, thus calling attention both to his misdeeds and to our
own failure to notice them.  In that world, I vigorously would
have sought to convict the defendant in the drug case, despite
my personal doubts, in order to add another “win” notch to my
belt.  The prosecutors in the Moussaoui trial would have simply
instructed their witnesses to say nothing about how they had
been improperly coached and would have gone on with their
case.  But fortunately for the criminal justice system, and for all
of us, Professor Davis has painted a seriously flawed and dis-
torted picture of what prosecutors do every day.  
I have always believed that,
as a prosecutor, you can’t
stand in front of a jury and
ask them to do something you
would not do yourself.
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Let me be clear at the outset: my aim is neither to deny
that prosecutorial misconduct occurs nor to condone it when it
does.  There are more than 35,000 prosecutors working around
the country in more than 2,300 state and local prosecutor’s
offices, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and at the Department of
Justice.12 Any time you have a human enterprise that large, you
are going to have some people who will break the rules.  There
are bad prosecutors, just as there are bad corporate CEO’s, bad
doctors, bad bankers, and bad defense attorneys.  And because
prosecutors wield a great deal of power, a prosecutor with cor-
rupt motives can cause tremendous harm.  True prosecutorial
misconduct, when it occurs, should be condemned and swiftly
punished.  
Prosecutorial misconduct, however, is the exception,
not the norm.  When it does take place, good prosecutors – who
know how serious true misconduct is and who must live with
the fallout and damage to the reputation of their profession – are
perhaps more upset by it than most people.  The vast majority
of prosecutors are dedicated public servants striving to do a dif-
ficult job in an ethical and honorable way.  The prosecutorial
world described by Professor Davis would be completely alien
to them, as it is to me.
A criminal defense lawyer’s duty is to her client.  Her
job is to represent her client zealously within the bounds of law
and ethics and to try to win, even if she knows her client is
guilty.  She has no obligation to seek the truth; in fact, in many
cases, she will be doing her job if she can obscure the truth and
keep it from coming to light.13
The prosecutor, however, has a different role, one
unlike that of any other advocate.  That role was most famous-
ly described by the Supreme Court decades ago:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation togovern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, there-
fore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or inno-
cence suffer.  He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor – indeed, he should do so.  But while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculat-
ed to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.14
Many other cases have likewise recognized this duty of a pros-
ecutor to seek to do justice and not merely to win.15
Prosecutors are expected to be zealous, but are to temper that
zeal with a recognition of their broader obligations.  As one for-
mer prosecutor has written, “[p]rosecutors of course are not as
impartial as judges, nor are they asked to be.  But they are asked
to be more impartial than defense attorneys.”16
The unique role of the prosecutor also is recognized in
various ethical and professional standards.  The American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
have been adopted by nearly every state,17 include Rule 3.8,
entitled “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.”18 Rule 3.8
provides, among other things, that a prosecutor must not know-
ingly bring charges not supported by probable cause, must work
to ensure that the rights of the defendant are protected, and must
make timely disclosure to the defense of all exculpatory evi-
dence (also known as Brady19 material).  The American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice similarly provide
that the “duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to
convict.”20 The National District Attorneys Association
Prosecution Standards state that the “primary responsibility of
prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished.”21
Each day, in thousands of cases around the country,
prosecutors decline to bring indictments, dismiss charges, turn
over evidence favorable to the defense, and take countless other
actions that benefit criminal defendants or make prosecuting a
case more difficult.  They do it because it’s their job, and their
professional obligation, to be focused on something more than
simply winning.  Their duties require them to do their best to
play by the rules, respect the rights of the accused, be complete-
ly candid with the court, and above all, to be certain they are
prosecuting the right people.
These obligations were drilled into me from the begin-
ning of my time at the U.S. Attorney’s office.22 Over the years,
I attended – and later taught – numerous training sessions on
issues such as Brady obligations, charging decisions, and the
proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  I attended profes-
sional conferences with other prosecutors from around the
country, where we shared our experiences and talked about how
best to fulfill our obligations while doing our jobs.  I participat-
ed in countless discussions with colleagues concerning such
issues as whether to bring particular charges, whether to inves-
tigate a particular defendant, or whether certain evidence con-
stituted Brady material.  We often wrestled with these issues,
not to decide how best to win (because then the decision is easy)
but to decide how best to fulfill our legal and ethical responsi-
bilities during the course of a prosecution.
Many may believe the notion that prosecutors would
actually seek to do justice is nothing more than a quaint plati-
tude.  Prosecutors are often portrayed in books and movies as
ruthless, political animals bent on winning at any cost, even if
it means knowingly convicting the innocent.  Some of the
recent excesses of the current Justice Department in alleged fur-
therance of the fight against terrorism have further added to
public skepticism of law enforcement.  In this cynical age, it is
easy to dismiss the special obligation of prosecutors as simply
a naïve and unrealistic ideal.
I don’t agree.  To most prosecutors – and to all good
prosecutors – this duty to seek justice really does mean some-
thing.  It becomes ingrained as part of your professional identi-
ty.  I saw it practiced every day during my twelve years as an
Assistant U.S. Attorney.  Prosecutors may not always agree
with each other, and certainly may not always agree with
defense counsel, about how best to fulfill that obligation in a
given situation.  But they always know that the obligation is
there.  
It is interesting, although perhaps not surprising, that
those commentators who believe that prosecutors do in fact
seek to meet this higher obligation tend to be former prosecu-
tors,23 while those who are the most vocal about alleged wide-
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spread prosecutorial misconduct tend to be current or former
criminal defense attorneys.24 In my experience, relations
between prosecutors and defense attorneys are generally colle-
gial and certainly no worse than relations among attorneys in
other segments of the bar.  It has also been my experience, how-
ever, that some criminal defense attorneys – particularly those
who, like Professor Davis, work or have worked as public
defenders – have very strong feelings about prosecutors.  They
seem to believe that prosecutors are morally suspect, simply by
virtue of their profession.  Indeed, in the title of a recent article,
one former public defender went so far as to ask, “Can you be a
good person and a good prosecutor?”25 Her answer: probably
not.26
I have no quarrel with the role of the defense attorney
in the criminal justice system: to represent her client with vigor
and put the government to its proof.  I do take issue, however,
with Professor Davis’s portrayal of how prosecutors operate
within that same system.  The prosecutor’s role carries with it a
unique set of obligations.  Seeking to fulfill the duty to do justice
is the foundation of the prosecutor’s job, and is at the heart of
every good prosecutor’s professional identity.  There is no basis
for the claim that prosecutors are routinely disregarding these
ethical and legal obligations to “abuse [their] power and discre-
tion.”27
The first difficulty with Professor Davis’s analysis lies
in the term “prosecutorial misconduct” itself.  Although this
problem did not originate with Professor Davis, it severely
undermines her arguments.  The problem is this:
much of what is labeled “prosecutorial miscon-
duct” is not “misconduct” at all, at least not as
that term is commonly understood.  
The word “misconduct” generally
denotes some kind of intentional wrongdoing.28
“Prosecutorial misconduct” therefore suggests
that the prosecutor has purposely acted in a way
that is unfair, unethical, or even illegal.  In truth,
however, “prosecutorial misconduct” is a catch
phrase used by the courts to describe virtually
anything done by the prosecution in a criminal
case that is subject to objection and possible legal
challenge.29 Use of the term says nothing about
the prosecutor’s intent or lack of good faith.30
In many cases, the label “prosecutorial misconduct” is
actually quite unfair to the prosecutor.  It is applied even to rou-
tine, inadvertent missteps that may be made by advocates in any
case – the kinds of mistakes that everyone who tries cases will
make from time to time.  It may refer to asking an improper ques-
tion, mentioning evidence that has not been properly admitted, or
making a misstatement during closing argument.  Such mistakes
can occur as a result of inexperience, nerves, carelessness, a mis-
judgment about what the law allows, or simply through an excess
of zeal in the heat of battle.  The mistakes may still be serious and
may even justify reversal of a conviction, but they are not “mis-
conduct” as that term is commonly understood.31 In such cases,
a more appropriate term would be “prosecutorial error.”32
Let me provide a couple of examples.  In the District of
Columbia, as well as in other jurisdictions, it is generally consid-
ered misconduct for the prosecutor to say during closing argu-
ment that the jury should “send a message” on behalf of the com-
munity by finding the defendant guilty.33 This is considered
improper because the jury is supposed to focus only on the facts
and whether the government has proved its case, not on pursuing
social policy by sending messages.34 In another D.C. case, it was
held to be misconduct when the prosecutor in closing argument
referred to the victim of a brutal homicide as having been “shot
down like a dog in the street” and called the killing an “assassi-
nation.”35 The court said these statements were an improper
attempt to inflame the passions of the jury.36
One can debate the merits of the rulings in such cases.
All can agree, however, that this type of so-called “misconduct”
by an advocate in the middle of trial is fundamentally different
from the behavior of a prosecutor who deliberately buries excul-
patory evidence or knowingly prosecutes an innocent man.  All
of these wide-ranging acts, however, are routinely grouped
together under the single heading of “prosecutorial miscon-
duct.”37
Nor are the rules about what will constitute “miscon-
duct” always clear.  For example, some cases hold that it is pros-
ecutorial misconduct in closing argument to call the defendant or
a witness a liar.38 Other cases, however, have found that this this
is not misconduct.39 In any event, it is fine to argue that the evi-
dence proves a witness’s testimony could not be true (in other
words, the witness is lying) as long as you don’t use the “L”
word.40 Similarly, a prosecutor cannot vouch for a witness by
saying “I believe he was telling you the truth,” but is free to
argue, “the evidence shows that he was telling you the truth,”
which of course tells the jury exactly what the prosecutor
believes.41 The “shot down like a dog in the street” line was held
to be unduly inflammatory, but other cases have
upheld language that seems indistinguishable or
even worse, including such lines as calling the
defendant a “sadistic killer.”42 Distinctions are
made in the minds of appellate judges that likely
are lost on juries, as well as on most advocates.43
Even seasoned prosecutors are sometimes uncer-
tain where the lines will be drawn.  
There are several important points to note
about this category of “prosecutorial miscon-
duct” – the category that I suggest would better
be called “prosecutorial error.”  First, the errors
take place in open court.  The defense attorney is
able to object, and the trial judge is able to inter-
vene, admonish the prosecutor, and issue a curative instruction to
the jury if necessary.  Nothing is done in secret or concealed from
the defense, the jury, or the judge.  The defense attorney is able
to follow up with her own questioning and argument and may
even be able to exploit the “misconduct” by suggesting to the
jury that the prosecution is not playing fair.  
Second, these types of errors are not committed only by
prosecutors.  Defense attorneys also make improper arguments,
refer to inadmissible evidence, and harass witnesses, both inten-
tionally and inadvertently.44 Indeed, given their duty of zealous
representation, they may be more likely to do so than the prose-
cutor, who has to worry about her obligations to justice and about
creating appellate issues.45 The difference is that a defense
lawyer who breaks the rules, even deliberately, likely will receive
at worst a scolding from the judge.  A prosecutor who makes
even an honest mistake, however, will be branded as having
engaged in “misconduct.”  
“The United States Attorney
is the representative ... of a 
sovereignty whose obligation
... in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be
done.”  
Justice Sutherland
Prosecutorial “Misconduct” vs. Prosecutorial Error
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As Professor Davis notes, alleged Brady violations are
another common source of claims of prosecutorial misconduct.46
Brady violations take place when the government fails to fulfill
its obligation to disclose material information in the govern-
ment’s possesion that is favorable to the defense.47 Again, how-
ever, simply labeling something a “Brady violation” tells you
nothing about the underlying circumstances or the motives of
the prosecutor, and the fact that a Brady violation is found does
not mean that the prosecutor engaged in willful misbehavior.
The good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant to the
Brady analysis.48 In fact, a Brady violation may be found
where the prosecutor himself didn’t even know about the infor-
mation that was not disclosed, as long as the police or someone
else on the prosecution team was aware of it.49
Brady material can range from compelling evidence
that clearly exculpates the accused to evidence that is arguably
cumulative and may not even be admissible.  Most difficult
Brady questions involve judgment calls about the value of the
evidence, and reasonable people can disagree.  Trial judges and
appellate judges themselves often differ over whether particular
information was Brady material.  As a prosecutor, however, if
you make a good-faith decision about Brady material and a
judge later disagrees, you haven’t just made a mistake: you’ve
engaged in “prosecutorial misconduct.”
Simply looking at statistics about the number of cases
that discuss prosecutorial misconduct or Brady violations there-
fore tells you very little about what actually happened in those
cases.  Such statistics also greatly overstate the incidence of true
willful misbehavior by the prosecution.  Most cases involving
allegations of “prosecutorial misconduct” do not involve delib-
erate wrongful conduct by the prosecution, and would more
accurately be characterized as prosecutorial error.50 Lumping
all of these cases together under the heading “prosecutorial mis-
conduct” obscures the very different issues and concerns that
underlie the different types of claims, and makes the problem of
true willful misconduct sound far greater than it actually is. 
As Professor Davis points out, most cases involving
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are upheld under the
“harmless error” doctrine.51 In other words, courts usually find
that the events labeled “prosecutorial misconduct” did not
affect the fundamental fairness of the trial or call into question
the result, and thus do not require a new trial.  This would be
harder to understand if most prosecutorial misconduct actually
involved deliberate wrongdoing by the prosecution.  It makes
sense, however, when we realize that much that is labeled “mis-
conduct” when done by the prosecution is better understood
simply as trial error, and often harmless error at that.
Professor Davis seems to suggest that the harmless
error standard is somehow illegitimate, a way for judges to
ignore or excuse the misbehavior of prosecutors.  The harmless
error doctrine, she argues, demonstrates that the courts place a
“higher premium on affirming convictions than [on] punishing
prosecutors who do wrong.”52 The problem with this claim is
that it suggests (incorrectly) that most allegations of “miscon-
duct” involve willful misbehavior that would make “punish-
ment” appropriate.  Because most of what is termed misconduct
does not involve deliberate wrongdoing, this criticism is mis-
placed.
The harmless error doctrine, of course, was not some-
thing invented by judges to allow them to excuse prosecutorial
misconduct.  In federal cases, for example, the harmless error
standard is contained in both the Criminal Rules and the United
States Code and applies to all aspects of a trial, not just to mis-
takes by prosecutors.53 Furthermore, it’s not clear exactly what
Professor Davis would propose as an alternative.  She may
believe it would be more appropriate if any finding of prosecu-
torial error – whether deliberate or not, and no matter how triv-
ial or inconsequential in the scheme of the overall trial – result-
ed in the automatic reversal of a conviction.  This is an argu-
ment that a defendant is entitled to a perfect trial, not merely a
fair one.  That is a worthy ideal but is something that has never
been required and, given the frailties of human actors, probably
can never be achieved.54
It is true that most cases where prosecutorial miscon-
duct is alleged are not reversed on appeal.  This is not because
judges are blindly allowing prosecutors to run roughshod over
the rights of defendants.  Rather, it is because most claims of
prosecutorial “misconduct” are either without merit or involve
what is better characterized as prosecutorial error.  It’s easy for
the defense to cry “prosecutorial misconduct” and attempt to
create an issue on appeal, and this is increasingly done as a
defense tactic.  In reality, however, most such claims have little
basis.  Most of the errors that do occur truly are harmless, and
characterizing them as “misconduct” doesn’t change that.
The second major flaw in Professor Davis’s analysis is
the lack of any empirical basis for her claims of widespread, fla-
grant prosecutorial misconduct.  The few studies on which she
does purport to rely do not come close to supporting her conclu-
sions.  
To bolster her claims about an “epidemic” of prosecu-
torial misconduct, Professor Davis relies primarily on two stud-
ies.56 The first, by the nonpartisan Center for Public Integrity
(“CPI”), examined 11,452 cases in which allegations of prose-
cutorial conduct were reviewed by appellate judges.    The study
looked at cases over about a 30-year period.58 The second
study involved a series published in the Chicago Tribune in
1999 by reporters Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley.59 This
study also examined about 11,000 cases, this time over a 36-
year period.60
A few points need to be made about these studies.
First, as discussed above, statistics on the number of cases
involving allegations of prosecutorial misconduct or Brady vio-
lations say nothing about the intent of the prosecutors, the
underlying merits of the allegations, or whether true profession-
al misconduct was involved.  In the CPI study, of the more than
11,000 cases reviewed only about 2,000 resulted in reversal of
a conviction or other relief to the defendant.61 In the great
majority of cases, either the claim of misconduct was not
upheld or the misconduct was found to be harmless error –
again, most likely because the “misconduct” was in fact simply
a trial error or minor Brady violation that did not affect the trial.
Similarly, the Chicago Tribune study found that convictions
were reversed in only 381 of the 11,000 cases studied.62
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I do not condone or excuse the conduct of any prose-
cutor found to have engaged in true misconduct.  Any intention-
al misconduct by the prosecution is reprehensible and must be
taken seriously.  At the same time, however, these numbers have
to be considered in context. The 2,000 cases of serious miscon-
duct over 30 years found in the CPI study works out to a rate of
about 66 cases per year; the 381 reversals in 36 years in the
Tribune study is an average of about 11 cases per year.  By con-
trast, in 2003 there were more than 70,000 federal criminal
cases filed in the United States District Courts, and more than
twenty million criminal cases filed in state courts.63 Even if we
limit the state criminal cases to felonies, the number is still
nearly three million.64 Sixty-six cases a year out of several mil-
lion is a vanishingly small number.  Even if the true incidence
of prosecutorial misconduct, reported and unreported, were 500
times greater than what was found in the CPI study, it would
still involve only about one percent of all serious criminal cases
filed in a year.
There are about 30,000 state and local
prosecutors in the United States and more than
5,000 more working for the Department of
Justice.65 Sixty-six cases of misconduct in a
year means that fewer than one-fifth of one per-
cent of all prosecutors were found to have com-
mitted misconduct.  If we assume that the truly
bad prosecutors are recidivists with multiple
claims of misconduct filed against them, then
the number of individual prosecutors involved
is even smaller.66
These are hardly “epidemic” numbers.
If anything, the data from these studies actually demonstrates
that prosecutorial misconduct is quite rare.67 Recognizing the
limitations of what they had found, the authors of the CPI study
noted that “[m]ost of the nation’s approximately 30,000 local
trial prosecutors strive to balance their understandable desire to
win – a desire supported by the vast majority of the citizenry –
with their duty to ensure justice.”68 One will search in vain for
any such acknowledgement by Professor Davis.
Cases of egregious misconduct make headlines.  This
is the same phenomenon that applies to all news.  When media
coverage is criticized as too negative or sensationalistic, it is
often observed that no one reports on all the planes that don’t
crash.  Similarly, no one reports on the thousands of cases every
day where prosecutors fulfill their obligations and follow the
rules.  Those cases don’t make their way into the reported deci-
sions or legal treatises.  Nobody writes lengthy newspaper
series investigating how prosecutors are doing their jobs prop-
erly.  Like the thousands of safe airline flights every day, these
cases proceed unnoticed through the system, because the sys-
tem is operating as it should.     
Studies talking about a few dozen cases per year there-
fore provide no support for claims of routine, widespread pros-
ecutorial misconduct.  Professor Davis, however, has a response
to this:  because much of what prosecutors do takes place in
secret, she says, a great deal of misconduct must occur that we
simply never hear about.69 She notes darkly that “there are
many opportunities for prosecutors to engage in misconduct
that are nearly impossible to discover.”70 Prosecutors interview
witnesses, make charging decisions, conduct grand jury inves-
tigations, and carry out other duties shielded from the public
eye.  These activities provide many opportunities for miscon-
duct that may never come to light.  Because they have the
opportunity, she argues, prosecutors routinely and purposefully
engage in misconduct, believing they will never be caught.71
Of course, defense attorneys also do a great many
things in secret.  Defense attorneys may mislead, intimidate, or
even threaten witnesses when meeting with them prior to trial.
They have the opportunity to coach witnesses, including their
clients, to commit perjury, and knowingly to sponsor perjured
testimony.  They have the ability to destroy or otherwise tamp-
er with physical evidence.  There have certainly been docu-
mented cases of all of these things occurring,72 and all of this
takes place outside of the public eye.  Indeed, unlike prosecu-
tors, defense attorneys are unhampered by any special ethical
responsibilities to be fair or to seek the truth, and they know for
certain that their actions will never be reviewed as part of a
claim of “misconduct.”  Presumably they would feel even more
at liberty than prosecutors to engage in secret wrongdoing.
Applying Professor Davis’s reasoning, then, are
we to conclude that deliberate misconduct by
defense attorneys is widespread and has reached
epidemic proportions?  I think not, although my
logic and evidence are just as compelling as hers
– which is to say, not compelling at all.
If history teaches us anything, it is that the
truth has a way of coming out.73 Some witness-
es who are abused will report what happened to
them.  Evidence that was thought to be
destroyed will come to light in another form.
Individuals victimized by misconduct or scan-
dal will come forward to report it.  If this pervasive, secretive
“culture of misconduct” existed, at least some of the hundreds
of thousands of people involved in various aspects of law
enforcement would come forward as whistleblowers to expose
it.  It is simply implausible to suggest that prosecutorial miscon-
duct is as widespread and routine as Professor Davis claims, but
we just don’t hear about it.
There is no empirical support for Professor Davis’s
charges of rampant prosecutorial misconduct.  Her argument
boils down to a claim that this lack of proof is simply evidence
of how effectively the secretive “culture of misconduct” is
operating.74 This reminds me of the old joke that prosecutors
tell about conspiracy: “Don’t worry if you have no evidence of
the conspiracy; that simply proves how effective the conspira-
tors have been at covering it up!”  One can only imagine how
Professor Davis, as a defense attorney, would justly ridicule any
prosecutor who leveled charges against a defendant with evi-
dence as flimsy as that used by her to accuse all prosecutors.   
To further attempt to bolster her claims of widespread
misconduct, Professor Davis discusses the facts of a few specif-
ic cases where the prosecutors’ behavior was truly abhorrent.
From those cases, she then leaps to the conclusion that this type
of misconduct is the norm.  This is a flawed argument, a falla-
cy known as Hasty Generalization.75 It is akin to discussing the
facts of the highly-publicized disappearance of Natalee
Holloway, and concluding that therefore most teenage girls who
travel to Aruba disappear without a trace.76
I believe that most prosecu-
tors, most of the time, try to
uphold their duty to seek jus-
tice and do not engage in
deliberate misconduct.  
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For example, Professor Davis spends a fair amount of
time discussing the case of Delma Banks.77 The conduct of the
prosecutors in that case was indeed appalling: they concealed
evidence proving that the prosecution’s star witnesses had been
coached and had perjured themselves, and that one was a paid
government informant.  They also knowingly relied on the per-
jured testimony to argue their case to the jury.  Banks was con-
victed of murder and nearly executed before the Supreme Court
intervened.78 As Professor Davis notes, the misconduct was so
outrageous that a number of former judges and other public
officials – including several former U.S. attorneys, a former
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, and a former FBI
director – filed amicus briefs on Banks’ behalf.79
After discussing Banks, however, Professor Davis
makes the startling assertion that Brady violations “as egre-
gious as those in Banks’ case” are “very common in prosecu-
tors’ offices,” and that the prosecutorial misconduct in that case
was “not unusual.”80 In other words, she believes it is “very
common” and “not unusual” for prosecutors to coach witnesses
to lie, and to commit crimes themselves by knowingly sponsor-
ing perjured testimony.  This is the stuff of police states: kanga-
roo courts and show trials where the prosecution has no concern
for due process or the rule of law.  If Professor Davis is correct
that such conduct is commonplace, then the foundations of the
criminal justice system have truly crumbled.  Surely she must
have some convincing evidence to back up this serious accusa-
tion?  
No, she does not.  In fact, in support of her sweeping
charge, Professor Davis cites only a single article, written by a
law student, which actually makes no such claim and certainly
contains no facts to support such a claim.81 The reality, of
course, is that there is no support for the accusation that such
blatant misconduct is routine because that is simply not true.
The Banks case is notorious precisely because the misconduct
in that case was so unusual and shocking.82
Professor Davis makes a similar error when she argues
that prosecutors who engage in misconduct suffer no adverse
consequences.  She discusses a handful of particular cases
before concluding that therefore “[m]ost prosecutors” who
engage in misconduct “not only escape punishment, but
advance in their careers.”83 This is the Aruba fallacy again:
because we can identify a few prosecutors who have been
accused of misconduct and have gone on to further their
careers, therefore this is what happens in “most” such cases.  
Some of Professor Davis’s arguments in this area are
particularly interesting, coming from a former defense attorney.
For example, she discusses the trial of several prosecutors and
sheriff’s deputies indicted for alleged misconduct in an Illinois
case involving a defendant named Rolando Cruz.84 All of the
law enforcement defendants were ultimately acquitted, and sev-
eral went on to advance in their careers.  Professor Davis criti-
cizes this result as evidence that misbehaving prosecutors are
rarely held to account.  Ordinarily, one would expect a defense
attorney to argue that a defendant who is acquitted by a jury is
still presumed to be innocent and is fully entitled to get on with
his life.  Perhaps this principle does not apply when the defen-
dant is a prosecutor.85
Once again, discussing a handful of particular cases
proves nothing about what happens to “most” prosecutors who
commit misconduct.  As Professor Davis acknowledges, many
types of state bar disciplinary proceedings are not public.86
Federal prosecutors are also subject to investigation and disci-
pline by the Department of Justice Office of Professional
Responsibility.87 Perhaps most important, the many forms of
internal discipline that take place – denial of a promotion,
denial of plum assignments, a negative performance evaluation
that affects a prosecutor’s salary, and the like – are confidential
personnel matters that are not made public.88 The truth is that
neither Professor Davis nor anyone else has sufficient informa-
tion to say what happens to “most” prosecutors who engage in
wrongful behavior.  It is safe to say, however, that there is no
reason to believe that prosecutors may routinely engage in
deliberate misconduct with no fear of professional repercus-
sions.
I believe that most prosecutors, most of the time, try to
uphold their duty to seek justice and do not engage in deliber-
ate misconduct.  Other than my personal experiences with many
prosecutors over the years, why do I believe this is the case?
The first and most important reason is simply that it is
a prosecutor’s job to do so.  As outlined above, prosecutors are
ethically, legally, and morally bound to seek justice; to see that
the guilty are punished but the innocent do not suffer.  They are
required to prosecute only those they honestly believe to be
guilty, to safeguard the rights of the defendant, to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense, and to be completely can-
did with the court.  
In the law, as in other fields, we generally presume that
practitioners will strive to follow the ethical and legal require-
ments of their profession.  If this were not the case, codes of
professional conduct and other such rules would be of little use.
Prosecutors will strive to fulfill their obligation to seek justice
first and foremost because they are bound by law, ethics, and
their oaths of office to do so.  I do not believe we should just
assume that such obligations have no affect on an individual.89
Indeed, this is what I find most remarkable about
Professor Davis’s article.  She has no hesitation about impugn-
ing the character of tens of thousands of attorneys, despite the
lack of any solid support for her claims.  She asserts that pros-
ecutors – simply by virtue of their profession – routinely engage
in conduct that in many cases is not only unethical, but crimi-
nal.  Apparently we are to presume that prosecutors, unlike
attorneys in any other area of practice, routinely disregard their
legal and ethical obligations when given the opportunity.  I am
at a loss to understand how Professor Davis can make such a
broad accusation based on such flimsy evidence.  Perhaps she
too believes that one cannot be both a good prosecutor and a
good person.
There is another, and much more practical, reason to
believe that prosecutors will generally play by the rules and try
to do the right thing: that is the type of prosecutor who is most
effective and, in the long run, most successful.  Much of what a
prosecutor does depends upon the ability of others to trust her
word and her character.  Judges must be willing to trust that
when the prosecutor makes a representation to them, it is the
truth.  Witnesses must be able to rely on the prosecutor’s word
about what will happen at trial.  Defense attorneys representing
a client who is considering pleading guilty and cooperating 
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with the government must be able to trust the prosecutor’s word
concerning their client’s status and what the prosecution will do
in exchange for the client’s cooperation.  A prosecutor who can-
not be trusted cannot, in the long run, be successful.
The single most important asset that any prosecutor
has is his good name.  Even in large cities, the criminal bar is a
relatively small community.  If a prosecutor gains a reputation
for being dishonest or corrupt, the consequences will be
extremely damaging.  For one thing, judges will no longer
accept the prosecutor’s word, which will make his day-to-day
life in court much more difficult.  Unlike most attorneys, pros-
ecutors regularly appear before the same judges time and time
again.  Those judges make countless rulings in the prosecutor’s
cases, not only on substantive issues, but on matters such as
scheduling.  A disgruntled judge has the ability to make a pros-
ecutor’s life extremely unpleasant.90
Similarly, if defense attorneys believe that a prosecu-
tor cannot be trusted, they will be less likely to advise their
clients to cooperate with the government.  Without cooperating
witnesses, building any kind of major prosecution is virtually
impossible.91 A defense lawyer can also make an untrustwor-
thy prosecutor’s life much more difficult simply by refusing to
engage in the informal give-and-take that normally takes place
concerning discovery, possible guilty pleas, and other matters.
Everything will become formalized.  Defense counsel will
insist that everything be in writing and on the record, generat-
ing more work for the prosecutor.  The defense also will be
more likely to file discovery motions and other pleadings seek-
ing the court’s intervention if they feel the prosecutor cannot be
trusted to fulfill her obligations.  These pleadings must be
responded to, further increasing the prosecutor’s workload.    
Even juries have the ability to punish the unscrupulous
prosecutor.  In a trial, if the prosecutor’s conduct draws repeat-
ed objections from the defense and admonitions from the judge,
the jury may come to believe that the prosecutor is not “playing
fair” and may register their disapproval with their verdict.  On
a broader scale, if a prosecutor’s office gains a reputation in the
community for being unethical or for engaging in misconduct,
the public will come to distrust the prosecutor’s office.  Because
the members of the community also make up the jury pools for
all of the office’s cases, this reputation will damage a prosecu-
tor’s ability to win the confidence of a jury.
Finally, there is the matter of professional reputation
and standing.  No prosecutor wants to have his name in a judi-
cial opinion finding that he committed “misconduct.”  In addi-
tion to tarnishing his professional reputation, any such finding,
whether or not it has merit, will likely result in disciplinary pro-
ceedings and reviews of the prosecutor’s conduct.  None of this
will be very pleasant for the prosecutor.  It is not a badge of
honor among prosecutors to be known as some kind of cowboy
who flaunts the rules.  Just as a defense attorney presumably
does not relish a court finding that he rendered “ineffective
assistance of counsel,” so too a prosecutor has a personal and
professional interest in seeing that she retains a reputation for
fairness and competence. 
In short, the best way for a prosecutor to be effective
and to advance her career is to be scrupulously fair and ethical.
An unethical or dishonest prosecutor may be able to secure a
conviction in a particular case, but over the long run the acts of
such a prosecutor will catch up with her.  
I believe that criminal prosecution is an honorable pro-
fession, and is one of the most rewarding jobs a lawyer can
have.  Standing before a court and jury as the representative of
the people in a criminal proceeding is both humbling and
immensely gratifying.  I never met a prosecutor who chose his
career out of some immoral lust for abusing witnesses and lock-
ing up innocent people.  Lawyers become prosecutors because
they rightly see it as satisfying, fulfilling work and as an impor-
tant service to the community.  Those who work as prosecutors
often make considerable personal and financial sacrifices to
pursue a career in public service.  They deserve better than to
be tarred by sweeping, unsupported attacks on their ethics and
character.
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